Unsymbolized Thinking (UT)
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This is quite interesting /sci/. I'm sure by now you are all familiar with unsymbolized thinking- https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00216/full
>“thinking a particular, definite thought without the awareness of that thought's being conveyed in words, images, or any other symbols”
Now see what happens when someone, (who is a philosophy professor even) is unaware of this concept and possibility and comes up with his own theory of consciousness that is based around the ABSENCE of awareness of this modality of thought in the human mind.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/there-is-no-such-thing-as-conscious-thought/
>In ordinary life we are quite content to say things like “Oh, I just had a thought” or “I was thinking to myself.” By this we usually mean instances of inner speech or visual imagery, which are at the center of our stream of consciousness—the train of words and visual contents represented in our minds. I think that these trains are indeed conscious. In neurophilosophy, however, we refer to “thought” in a much more specific sense. In this view, thoughts include only nonsensory mental attitudes, such as judgments, decisions, intentions and goals. These are amodal, abstract events, meaning that they are not sensory experiences and are not tied to sensory experiences. Such thoughts never figure in working memory. They never become conscious. And we only ever know of them by interpreting what does become conscious, such as visual imagery and the words we hear ourselves say in our heads.
Note how the professor has falsely assumed that non-sensory thoughts never become conscious to someone, never appear in working memory- that only their end result do (visual imagery or inner speech) but to someone familiar with unsymbolized thinking this is obviously wrong and we can experience and recognize these thoughts without any accompanying or trailing "sensory" experience (such as visual imagery/kinesthetic feeling or inner speech).
>“thinking a particular, definite thought without the awareness of that thought's being conveyed in words, images, or any other symbols”
Now see what happens when someone, (who is a philosophy professor even) is unaware of this concept and possibility and comes up with his own theory of consciousness that is based around the ABSENCE of awareness of this modality of thought in the human mind.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/there-is-no-such-thing-as-conscious-thought/
>In ordinary life we are quite content to say things like “Oh, I just had a thought” or “I was thinking to myself.” By this we usually mean instances of inner speech or visual imagery, which are at the center of our stream of consciousness—the train of words and visual contents represented in our minds. I think that these trains are indeed conscious. In neurophilosophy, however, we refer to “thought” in a much more specific sense. In this view, thoughts include only nonsensory mental attitudes, such as judgments, decisions, intentions and goals. These are amodal, abstract events, meaning that they are not sensory experiences and are not tied to sensory experiences. Such thoughts never figure in working memory. They never become conscious. And we only ever know of them by interpreting what does become conscious, such as visual imagery and the words we hear ourselves say in our heads.
Note how the professor has falsely assumed that non-sensory thoughts never become conscious to someone, never appear in working memory- that only their end result do (visual imagery or inner speech) but to someone familiar with unsymbolized thinking this is obviously wrong and we can experience and recognize these thoughts without any accompanying or trailing "sensory" experience (such as visual imagery/kinesthetic feeling or inner speech).
