>>10531863Have you played the game Soma? Your idea that "true uploading", ie continuation of the same phenomenal entity is possible if the biological subject is killed the same time as the digital subject is activated, is very similar to the theory one of the characters in Soma holds.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rS4T0WkRlVcI think the twin paradox shouldn't make you take this stance, I think it should make you reconsider the entire framework in which you're thinking about this in the first place. There is no logical reason why whether the biological brain is alive or not, should affect the digital copy in any way, unless you're proposing some weird Cartesian Dualism, and some elaborate natural system that automatically swap souls between bodies that are compatible.
To really truly know what happens when we teleport or upload, we need to first know the solution to the hard problem of consciousness.
Maybe upload isn't contingent on information being the same, but instead on the brain as a whole process being uninterrupted. If the brain sort of gives rise to consciousness in an emergent way, then it's not the identity of any of the parts that's important, it's that the whole keeps going. In the case of the natural, gradual replacement of atoms in our brain, this wouldn't be a problem for this view, yet for teleporting or uploading, there's an abrupt stop.
If this view is correct, then there is another option for upload: Gradual upload. You replace your neurons one by one in the brain by silicon chip counterparts. After one neuron replacement, the new one performs the same function as the old one, and thus the whole keeps going. Keep replacing until they are all silicon chips, and you have now uploaded with the same phenomenal identity intact.
