>>13306846>The substance being a particular kind of thing and a property being predicated of the substance (i.e. it's something the substance has) which can be viewed as different aspects.Reality being a particular kind of thing and a substance being predicated on reality (i.e. it's something reality has) which can be viewed as distinct substances
>In dual aspect, the brain is take to encompass a whole of material and immaterial properties, and it's not just the brain but literally everything that it understood in this way. In dualism, the brain is taken to encompass a whole of material and immaterial substances, and it's not just the brain but literally everything that is understood in this way.
>These aspects don't come together to form the brain, neither does one necessarily produce the other in an emergent or spontaneous way (though this doesn't disqualify "levels"), nor are they necessarily distinct from one another like Cartesian dualism except in the way in which we perceive them to be aspects or properties. These substances don't come together to form the brain, neither does on ehecessarily produce the other in an emergent or spontaneous way (though this doesn't disqualify "levels"), nor are they necessarily distinct from one another like Cartesian dualism except in the way in which we perceive them to be substances.
>They are manifestations of one thing, two sides of the same coin so to speak, the coin being the substance, the two sides being the properties of the coin or what the coin has.They are manifestations of one thing, two sides of the same coin so to speak, the coin being reality, the two sides being the substances of reality or what reality has.
You have still not explained the necessity for introducing "dual aspect monism" except as a dualist cope. I'm arguing definitions and language because it's the only level on which "dual aspect monism" is actually distinct from dualism.
