Pascal's mugging is BULLSHIT
No.12530574 ViewReplyOriginalReport
Quoted By: >>12531944 >>12533821 >>12533958 >>12534717
Is the LessWrong/"Rationalist" community genuinely retarded?
>muh basilisk
>muh mugging
Look at how much [1] was downboated. Pascal's mugging is obviously INVALID because (1) the premise and (2) the negation of the conclusion can be simultaneously true:
(1) ?x, p(threat is true | threat is of x harm) > 0
(2) ?x, E(harm | threat is of x harm) < 1
How? Just let
- ?x, p(threat is true | threat is of x harm) < 1/x
Then
E(harm | threat is of x harm)
= p(threat is true | threat is of x harm) * x
< 1/x * x
< 1
That is, our belief the threat is true can *decrease* faster than the magnitude of the threat. This is enough to show the argument is INVALID. It's NONSENSE. PERIOD.
[2] makes EXACTLY the same point:
>Pascal cannot determine the probability that Mugger will keep his promise independently from what Mugger promises to do. This probability depends on what exactly Pascal promises to do.
>We can assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the larger the sum of money (or the amount of ‘utils’) Mugger promises to deliver, the lower the probability Pascal should assign to the proposition that Mugger will stick with his promise. What if Pascal's probability assignments for ‘Mugger will deliver something of value m’ are a simple function of the value of ‘m’? Moreover, what if for all values of ‘m’ and ‘p’, the following is true: m times p < 1? This is perfectly possible and even realistic. Pascal's probabilities would go down faster than Mugger's offer's utilities go up – so to speak. Clearly, Pascal should not agree to this deal because he would face a clear expected loss.
NOTE: I'm discussing Pascal's MUGGING, not Pascal's Wager. The latter is completely irrelevant and off-topic, so don't derail the thread you faggots.
[1] lesswrong.com/posts/9WZAqFzNJ4KrhsqJ7/pascal-s-mugging-solved
[2] doi.org/10.1093/analys/anp061
>muh basilisk
>muh mugging
Look at how much [1] was downboated. Pascal's mugging is obviously INVALID because (1) the premise and (2) the negation of the conclusion can be simultaneously true:
(1) ?x, p(threat is true | threat is of x harm) > 0
(2) ?x, E(harm | threat is of x harm) < 1
How? Just let
- ?x, p(threat is true | threat is of x harm) < 1/x
Then
E(harm | threat is of x harm)
= p(threat is true | threat is of x harm) * x
< 1/x * x
< 1
That is, our belief the threat is true can *decrease* faster than the magnitude of the threat. This is enough to show the argument is INVALID. It's NONSENSE. PERIOD.
[2] makes EXACTLY the same point:
>Pascal cannot determine the probability that Mugger will keep his promise independently from what Mugger promises to do. This probability depends on what exactly Pascal promises to do.
>We can assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the larger the sum of money (or the amount of ‘utils’) Mugger promises to deliver, the lower the probability Pascal should assign to the proposition that Mugger will stick with his promise. What if Pascal's probability assignments for ‘Mugger will deliver something of value m’ are a simple function of the value of ‘m’? Moreover, what if for all values of ‘m’ and ‘p’, the following is true: m times p < 1? This is perfectly possible and even realistic. Pascal's probabilities would go down faster than Mugger's offer's utilities go up – so to speak. Clearly, Pascal should not agree to this deal because he would face a clear expected loss.
NOTE: I'm discussing Pascal's MUGGING, not Pascal's Wager. The latter is completely irrelevant and off-topic, so don't derail the thread you faggots.
[1] lesswrong.com/posts/9WZAqFzNJ4KrhsqJ7/pascal-s-mugging-solved
[2] doi.org/10.1093/analys/anp061
