Magic is inextricably linked to simulation metaphysics and all other forms of procedural generation. This means that every model that has an internal notion of consistency, applied at scale, will invariably produce a region of impossibilities over which the initial model cannot produce predictions. Put simply, a model in and of itself has no means to produce statements about phenomena that seem contrary to its scope. This has implications over the epistemology of complete theories of everything, but we need to introduce a few more concepts before it can be considered as a proof.

First, we must establish a sterile model of metaphysics; that is, one in which our assumptions about magic have unknown quality. For the sake of discussion, we start with an assumption that physical magic is distant from the genitive locus of our mock model. Since the locus is an argument-toward-proof, all models prior this are considered formally distant. Further, any model supposing consistent operation at scale can be reconsidered as a procedural generation model for the sake of this argument. In absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must assume that all models of ubiquitous nature have a more internally consistent variation under generative reasoning. This is so primarily due to the nature of finite assumptions.


Note, at this time, that the number of phenomena we can model via discrete simulation is very low. Most common notions of the scope of an advanced simulation involve complete ignorance of information theory and read more like an art project than some description of nonmagical phenomena. After a point in our measurements we should assume that running a simulation requires truly magical amounts of computing power, far beyond the grandest limit of our civilization. Recall, again, that any external interaction with the contents of a simulation would manifest as magic to that world and you should have a fairly intuitive grasp of why disparate models do not refute each other.