>>11930743So if we accept that simulated "clones" of us are actually "us", it would follow that there are infinite versions of us that are actually "us". I.e. every version of you in many worlds is "you", as well as every possible simulated version of you that can exist. In which case, why would we worry about one instance being tortured by a basilisk when there are infinite others where it isn't happening? If there are infinite versions of you then there will be versions enduring eternal torment regardless of if you worship some basilisk concept.
Meanwhile if we simply refuse the notion that a simulated clone of ourselves would actually be us the entire premise for the basilisk falls apart.
The entire argument is based on the assumption that a simulated clone of ourselves would indeed be ourselves, and we therefore have a stake in its (by extension, our) well-being. This is a pretty wild assumption, and if we accept it to be true then by extension we have to accept so much else about the nature of our reality that the basilisk becomes the least of our problems.
