>>11682512>It feels like we're just stretching the definition of physical to include consciousness without really saying much about it.do you have a competing definition of physical you'd like to offer? because if by physical all you mean is "not mental" then the term is already halfway towards being meaningless. why shouldn't a physicalist believe that consciousness is physical(while still being consciousness), if they believe that everything is physical?
>If it does have the same structural and behavioral properties as the rest of the physical phenomena, then you're back to square 1, because none of those properties seem to be able to give you consciousness.what does this even mean? consciousness does not emerge out of anything, nor do you derive or out of anything. consciousness is directly experienced, it's the most certainly known thing there is. it's just also physical, which just happens to be made out of experience
this is not idealism because it's completely realist, everything is wholly mind independent (except for the parts that are minds), and is made of experience ;^)
