Sci I need help im going to go inane if I dont figure this out
Ok so lets say consciousness is a universal property that correlates with the kolmogorov complexity of an object. The possible qualia within an object can be analyzed by considering what it can represent. Since representation can explode into infnite possibilities, we'll consider only direct representation. So if some external process is required to measure a certain representation, it does not count. For example, the patterning of cloth can represent text, but only cloth with text on it would be considered representational of the shapes of the text.
These are axioms, not up for debate.
So what I am trying to figure out is what would the magnitude of consciousness be? The problem I have is, what makes an ants experience less vivid than mine? It seems natural to assume they must experience less pain because less neurons to represent it. But the problem with that is the representation of something doesnt seem to be connected to the complexity of what creates it. A small pebble and a large rock under this theory have the same consciousness even though one is more complex having far more atoms. The space of representations they have is about the same, and to try to really point at the problem, they both represent "1" just the same. There are different consequences based on their nature, a big rock can be broken into more pieces. But that doesnt seem to change representations they have in common. So then, what is the difference between pain represented by 100 neurons vs 1 billion? Both could be creating a similar model, the 1 billion just higher resolution. But we already established resolution does not neccesarily correlate with magnitude. So what the fuck?
Ok so lets say consciousness is a universal property that correlates with the kolmogorov complexity of an object. The possible qualia within an object can be analyzed by considering what it can represent. Since representation can explode into infnite possibilities, we'll consider only direct representation. So if some external process is required to measure a certain representation, it does not count. For example, the patterning of cloth can represent text, but only cloth with text on it would be considered representational of the shapes of the text.
These are axioms, not up for debate.
So what I am trying to figure out is what would the magnitude of consciousness be? The problem I have is, what makes an ants experience less vivid than mine? It seems natural to assume they must experience less pain because less neurons to represent it. But the problem with that is the representation of something doesnt seem to be connected to the complexity of what creates it. A small pebble and a large rock under this theory have the same consciousness even though one is more complex having far more atoms. The space of representations they have is about the same, and to try to really point at the problem, they both represent "1" just the same. There are different consequences based on their nature, a big rock can be broken into more pieces. But that doesnt seem to change representations they have in common. So then, what is the difference between pain represented by 100 neurons vs 1 billion? Both could be creating a similar model, the 1 billion just higher resolution. But we already established resolution does not neccesarily correlate with magnitude. So what the fuck?
