I don't follow the logic of the anthropic argument for the multiverse hypothesis.
The argument as I've heard it put forward is as follows: first, that the current physical state of the universe was chaotically determined, thus the physical conditions we observe could easily have actually had any of a very wide range of values other than those which actually prevail. Second, that the physical conditions necessary to permit life to exist in the universe occupy a very narrow range. It's unlikely that a singular, "randomly generated" universe would have conditions falling within this range. From this, it's argued that there must likely be a large number of universes in order that one or some can be statistically expected to exhibit conditions within the range permitting life.
I don't understand how the conclusion follows the premises. Couldn't you choose literally any other arbitrary narrow range of conditions, life-supporting or not, and with equal validity say of a hypothetical universe which fell within them that, since the universe falling within that range of conditions is unlikely, there must likely be a large number of universes in order that one can be statistically expected to exhibit conditions within that range?
If I randomly generate an integer between 1 and 10^100, whatever result I get is unlikely, but within expectations. I don't have to hypothesise 10^100 dice rolls. Only if I independently generated a second number and it was the same or similar could I call it an unlikely coincidence. The anthropic argument for multiple universes seems to rely on an unspoken assumption that life has some independent significance as a physical phenomenon.
The argument as I've heard it put forward is as follows: first, that the current physical state of the universe was chaotically determined, thus the physical conditions we observe could easily have actually had any of a very wide range of values other than those which actually prevail. Second, that the physical conditions necessary to permit life to exist in the universe occupy a very narrow range. It's unlikely that a singular, "randomly generated" universe would have conditions falling within this range. From this, it's argued that there must likely be a large number of universes in order that one or some can be statistically expected to exhibit conditions within the range permitting life.
I don't understand how the conclusion follows the premises. Couldn't you choose literally any other arbitrary narrow range of conditions, life-supporting or not, and with equal validity say of a hypothetical universe which fell within them that, since the universe falling within that range of conditions is unlikely, there must likely be a large number of universes in order that one can be statistically expected to exhibit conditions within that range?
If I randomly generate an integer between 1 and 10^100, whatever result I get is unlikely, but within expectations. I don't have to hypothesise 10^100 dice rolls. Only if I independently generated a second number and it was the same or similar could I call it an unlikely coincidence. The anthropic argument for multiple universes seems to rely on an unspoken assumption that life has some independent significance as a physical phenomenon.
