>>11113334What I'm trying to get across is that those are two wildly different concepts. If you copy that thing, you get a copy of that thing. There are now two of you. This is great, but the original you still exists. Nothing has changed from the point of view of the original you. If we kill the original, you don't get magically uploaded, you just die. The copy of you lives on! But you're dead. So you haven't actually transfered your mind, you've just commited an elaborate suicide and left behind a copy of yourself.
Transfer, on the other hand, could (maybe?) be accomplished by slowly substituting bits of you until the entire "you" is artificial. Because the continuity is kept, there's no point where an old and new "you" exist.
>>11113337Don't be obtuse. You enter a machine. You and a copy exit. That does not mean you are the copy. If we alter the machine, so that the original dies, it's simply an elaborate suicide booth that creates a copy. This is the teleporter problem and is indeed well defined.
