>>14419870>It's a reasonable hypothesis that cognition is a form of computationDepends what you consider 'cognition', for example embodied cognition and distributive cognition are non-representational forms of cognition. If you shake a stack of objects to see if it's steady - that's not entirely computation, you're seeking non-computational feedback from the world. If you stick one foot in the water and 'decide' it's too cold: that's not computation, you haven't taken a reading in terms of numbers. It's non-representational, the water is the direct source of data.
Is that not 'cognition'? After all you can decide to still plunge in and override your urges. But the 1:1 analogy of the human mind as being a computer just doesn't make sense.
The human mind doesn't convert everything to a universal binary 'language' - each segment of the brain is notorious for operating in it's own 'private language' which isn't really a language at all since unlike a processor which has a stack of registers which store the output of some calculations, which in turn form the representation, when you look at the neuronal structure of the hypothalamus I think it is: you'll see that 'representations' of physical spaces and time are physically embodied in the structure that connects neurons. That doesn't happen in a computer.
Yes the human mind can do 'computing' - that's where Turing got the idea of the Universal Machine from. But computing is only one very specific example of what a human mind does.
