>Moreover, the Materialist ought to be asked what is the exact nature of that consciousness which he supposes to be exuded from the elements. For he does not admit the existence of any other principle apart from his material elements. He will perhaps try to define consciousness as consisting in the mere fact that the elements and their products are experienced. But then they would have to be its object, and it could not be a property of them at the same time, for it is contradictory to suppose that anything can act on itself. Fire may be hot, but it cannot burn itself, and not even the cleverest acrobat can climb up on his own shoulders. And, in the same way, the elements and their products cannot form objects of consciousness if consciousness is their property. A colour does not perceive its own colour or the colour of anything else. And yet there is no doubt whatever that the elements and their products are perceived by consciousness, both inside and outside the body. Because, therefore, the presence of a consciousness which takes the elements and their products as its objects has to be admitted, it follows that it has likewise to be admitted that consciousness is distinct and separate from them.
