>>13387633>Your concept of "self" is not in the specific matter that the brain is made of, it is in the information that is stored in the brainThis implies it must be stored in the brain
>If you disagree that a perfect copy would be just as much "you" as the originalWhy do you put "you" in parenthesis?
>then the burden is on you to show what it is about the original that is not present in the copy, and how this can be measuredI said the two brains should be identical
>You have an object-oriented view of consciousness, this is silly. Consciousness is a process, the idea that your current consciousness is in some sense the same "thing" as your consciousness 5 mins ago is an illusion created by the fact that your memories are also an input to this processI don't see how this disagrees with what I said.
If the signals in your brain are uploaded into a computer faster than synapses can fire does it mean you are uploaded into a computer and will live as long as the computer is turned on?
Most people would say a copy of you would live forever, you would still end. But If the brain is nothing more than a process then a process itself can be transferred to a different medium.
For some people they think if nanobots replace the cells in your brains then your biological brain can be replaced and you would live as long as that artificial brain exists. But for whatever reason they also think if the nanobots merely copied the info of your brain cells instead of replacing them then it's only a copy of you. It makes no sense. They are attributing something greater than physicalism to the consciousness process.
It's a conundrum: if you transfer your conscious' medium physically then there is no copy it's the original, but if you transfer it digitally then it's a copy. This is implying consciousness is more than a process, it's attached to physical matter.
